





































































































































The  Retirement  Incentive  Effects  of  Canada’s  Income  Security  Programs 
 
 
November,  2001 
 
Michael  Baker 
University  of  Toronto 
 
Jonathan  Gruber 
MIT 
 
Kevin  Milligan 





















We  are  grateful  to  Statistics  Canada  and  Human  Resources  Development  Canada  for  research  support,  Sue  Biscope, 
Richard  Dupuy,  Leonard  Landry  and  Garnett  Picot  for  assistance  accessing  the  data,  Andrea  Wenham  and  Terence 
Yuen  for  excellent  research  assistance  and  to  Paul  Finn  and  participants  in  seminars  at  UBC,  HRDC  and  the  NBER 
for  helpful  comments.    All  views  expressed  in  this  paper  are  the  authors’  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of 



































Canada’s  Income  Security  (IS)  programs  for  seniors  face  an  uncertain  fiscal  future.   
Unfortunate  collisions  of  demography  and  “pay  as  you  go”  financing  have  precipitated  periodic 
crises  for  both  the  Canada  and  Quebec  Pension  Plans.    But  there  is  another  trend  that  is  equally 
ominous  for  long  run  fiscal  balances:  the  substantial  reduction  in  the  work  effort  of  older 
Canadians.  From  the  beginning  of  the  1960s  through  the  end  of  the  1990s  the  labour  force 
participation  rate  of  55-64  year  old  men  fell  from  87  percent  to  61  percent.    For  men  aged  65+  it 
fell  from  30  percent  to  under  10  percent.    The  decline  in  the  working  older  age  population  both 
lowers  the  tax  revenues  that  finance  IS  programs  and  raises  the  benefits  payments  from  these 
programs,  worsening  their  net  fiscal  position. 
Ironically,  the  IS  programs  may  have  made  a  significant  contribution  the  time  trend  in 
retirement  that  threatens  them.  The  time  series  correlation  is  striking,  as  this  period  saw  an 
enormous  expansion  of  IS  programs:  the  Canada/Quebec  Pension  Plans  were  greatly  expanded, 
and  new  income  support  programs  for  low  income  seniors  were  introduced  or  expanded. 
Of  course,  simple  trend  comparisons  are  not  a  sufficient  basis  for  concluding  that  IS 
programs  played  a  major  role  in  these  trends,  or  contemplating  IS  reform.    Instead,  we  require 
formal,  robust  inference  on  the  behavioural  effects  of  program  parameters.    For  many  countries 
there  are  large  and  growing  literatures  on  the  incentive  effects  of  their  national  social  security 
programs.    Furthermore,  many  governments  are  investing  in  research  programs  on  aging  to  help 
refine  the  inference.    In  contrast,  there  are  but  a  handful  of  studies  of  Canada’s  IS  programs.   
One  explanation  of  this  outcome  is  there  are  few  data  sets  in  Canada  with  sufficient  samples  of 
older  individuals  and  adequate  information  on  their  IS  entitlements  to  support  such  a  program. 
In  this  paper  we  attempt  to  fill  in  some  of  the  gaps  in  the  Canadian  literature,  providing 
estimates  of  the  incentive  effects  of  the  full  web  of  federal  IS  programs  using  an  extraordinary   4
new  data  set.    These  data  are  a  union  of  numerous  administrative  sources,  and  provide  a  large 
sample  of  older  workers  and  detailed  information  on  their  earnings  histories,  marital 
circumstances,  spousal  and  job  characteristics  and  labour  supply  choices.     
Using  this  information  we  construct  estimates  of  individuals’  entitlements  to  Canada  and 
Quebec  Pension  Plan  (CPP  and  QPP)  benefits,  the  Old  Age  Security  Pension  (OAS),  the 
Guaranteed  Income  Supplement  (GIS)  and  Spouse’s  Allowance  (SPA).
1    Our  measure  of  the 
labour  market  incentives  provided  by  these  programs  is  based  on  the  present  discounted  value  of 
the  stream  of  benefit  entitlements  from  these  programs  for  a  given  retirement  age.    By 
recalculating  this  sum  at  each  possible  retirement  age  we  create  accrual  variables  that  capture  the 
change  in  total  IS  entitlements  with  additional  years  of  work.    We  calculate  a  variety  of  accrual 
variables,  which  alternatively  assume  the  worker  is  relatively  short  or  long  sighted  when  making 
the  retirement  decision.    We  then  relate  these  incentive  measures  to  individuals’  labour  market 
decisions  between  age  55  and  age  64—the  primary  retirement  ages. 
There  is  a  growing  recognition  in  the  literature  that  identification  can  be  problematic  in 
empirical  models  of  retirement  (Coile  and  Gruber  2000,  Chan  and  Stevens  2001).    This  is 
because  cross  individual  variation  in  benefit  entitlement  is  typically  the  basis  of  identification.   
There  are  a  variety  of  sources  of  variation  in  benefit  entitlement  across  individuals,  but  clearly 
one  of  the  more  important  is  lifetime  wages  or  earnings.    The  problem  arises  because  variation  in 
lifetime  wages  may  in  turn  capture  heterogeneity  in  work  preferences.  Accordingly,  we  are 
careful  to  document  any  variation  in  inference  across  specifications  that,  alternatively,  do  and  do 
not  control  for  individuals’  lifetime  earnings. 
We  also  explore  variation  in  the  results  across  samples  defined  by  the  probability  of 
being  a  member  of  a  Registered  Pension  Plan  and  particular  income  quartile,  as  well  as  across   5
different  definitions  of  retirement.    The  estimates  vary  in  sensible  ways,  which  lends  greater 
confidence  to  our  inference. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  laid  out  as  follows.    First,  we  describe  the  previous  literature  and 
the  elements  of  Canada’s  income  security  system  and  the  retirement  income  environment.    Next, 
we  describe  the  construction  of  the  data  set  and  the  incentive  variables  used  in  the  analysis.    We 
then  proceed  to  lay  out  the  empirical  framework  and  present  the  results.    Finally,  we  offer  some 
conclusion. 
 
I.    Previous  Literature 
The  economics  of  aging  literature  in  Canada  is  relatively  new  and  still  quite  small.
2    As 
noted  above,  a  major  obstacle  is  the  lack  of  panel  data  that  provide  large  samples  of  older 
workers.    This  problem  is  not  unique  to  Canada,  however,  as  special  surveys  have  been  initiated 
in  some  countries  to  remedy  this  problem  (e.g.,  the  US  Health  and  Retirement  Survey). 
Pesando  and  Rea  (1977)  and  Burbidge  (1987)  are  early  studies  that  document  the 
parameters  of  Canada’s  IS  system  and  provide  theoretical  analyses  of  some  of  their  incentives.   
Specific  features  of  the  CPP/QPP  programs  have  recently  been  examined  by  Baker  and 
Benjamin  (1999a,  1999b)  and  Baker  (2002).    These  include  the  elimination  of  the  CPP/QPP 
earnings  test  and  the  introduction  of  the  Spouse’s  Allowance  (SPA)  in  the  1970s  and  the 
introduction  of  early  retirement  to  the  CPP/QPP  in  the  1980s.    Tompa  (1999)  investigates  the 
determinants  of  the  CPP  take-up  decision.  These  studies  offer  mixed  results:  some  of  the 
program  reforms  appear  to  have  affected  retirement  behaviour  (the  earnings  test  and  SPA)  while 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  On  July  31,  2000  the  name  of  the  Spouse’s  Allowance  was  changed  to  the  ‘Allowance.’ 
2  Our  focus  here  is  on  studies  of  public  pension  and  income  security  programs.    There  is  a  small  related  literature  on 
the  incentives  in  Registered  Pension  Plans.    See  Gunderson  and  Pesando  (1988)  and  Gunderson  and  Pesando  (1991).   6
others  did  not  (early  retirement).  In  any  event,  an  obvious  shortcoming  of  this  research  for  the 
purposes  of  program  reform  is  its  focus  on  single  features  of  programs  in  isolation. 
Recently  Gruber  (1999)  provides  a  step  towards  more  comprehensive  analysis  by 
documenting  the  incentive  effects  of  the  entire  web  of  IS  programs  based  on  simulated  earnings 
histories.    He  shows  that  there  are  positive  incentives  for  retirement  starting  at  age  60  that  grow 
particularly  large  by  age  69. 
Another  recent  contribution  to  this  literature  is  offered  by  Compton  (2001).    She 
estimates  the  incentive  effects  of  the  full  CPP/QPP  program  using  Survey  of  Labour  and  Income 
Dynamics  (SLID)  data  for  1993-1996,  and  concludes  that  program  parameters  have  little  effect 
on  retirement  decisions.    There  are  at  least  two  reasons,  however,  that  this  conclusion  may  be  too 
strong.    First,  the  modelling  of  retirement  incentives  in  the  paper  is  limited  by  the  SLID’s  short 
time  span.  As  a  consequence  most  of  a  worker’s  earnings  history  is  not  observed,  which  hampers 
the  construction  of  CPP/QPP  benefits.  In  addition,  as  we  document  below,  the  interactions  of  the 
CPP/QPP  with  the  income-tested  retirement  income  programs  are  crucial  to  understanding  the 
effect  of  incentives  on  retirement  in  Canada.  Therefore,  as  noted  in  the  discussion  of  the  Baker 
and  Benjamin  papers  no  strong  conclusions  should  be  drawn  from  looking  at  one  component  of 
the  system  in  isolation. 
A  second  shortcoming  is  the  method  used  to  impute  CPP/QPP  benefits  to  potential 
retirees.    These  benefits  are  imputed  to  workers  based  on  a  sample  of  workers  who  both  work 
and  collect  CPP/QPP  benefits.    This  sample  is  not  likely  to  be  representative  of  the  working 
population.    Furthermore,  the  variables  that  are  used  to  predict  CPP/QPP  benefits  are  included  in 
the  retirement  regressions  along  side  the  imputed  CPP/QPP  benefit.    With  no  variables  from  the 
first  stage  excluded,  there  is  no  identifying  variation  left  for  the  CPP/QPP  effect,  which  renders   7
its  explanatory  power  inert.    Finally,  the  results  using  this  methodology  find  no  evidence  that 
money  matters,  but  the  precision  of  the  estimates  is  low,  so  large  incentive  effects  cannot  be 
statistically  ruled  out  either. 
 
II.    An  Overview  of  the  Income  Security  System 
Canadians  make  their  retirement  decisions  within  the  context  of  a  three  component  IS 
system  that  is  largely  a  creature  of  the  1960’s.    The  first  component,  the  OAS  pension,  was  until 
recently  a  demogrant  available  to  individuals  starting  at  age  65.    The  second  component  is  the 
GIS,  and  related  SPA,  which  are  income  tested  benefits.    The  third  component  is  the  contributory 
public  pension  plans,  the  CPP  and  QPP,  in  which  benefit  entitlement  is  directly  related  to 
individuals’  lifetime  work  histories.    As  reference  for  the  following  overview  of  the  system,  a 
graph  of  the  levels  of  benefits  paid  out  by  these  programs  since  1980  is  presented  in  figure  1. 
 
The  Old  Age  Security  Pension 
The  OAS  was  established  in  1952,  replacing  existing  provincial  means  tested,  cost 
shared,  programs  that  had  been  in  place  from  as  early  as  1927.    Benefits  are  available  to  any 
individual  aged  65  or  older,  who  meets  certain  residency  requirements.
3    Originally  benefits  were 
available  to  individuals  starting  at  age  70,  but  this  was  lowered  to  age  65  over  a  5  year  period 
starting  in  1966.   
 
                                                                                                                    
3  Individuals  a)  must  be  a  Canadian  citizen  or  legal  resident  of  Canada  on  the  day  preceding  the  application’s 
approval;  or  b)  if  no  longer  living  in  Canada,  must  have  been  a  Canadian  citizen  or  a  legal  resident  of  Canada  on  the 
day  preceding  the  day  he  or  she  stopped  living  in  Canada.    A  minimum  of  ten  years  of  residence  in  Canada  after 
reaching  age  18  is  required  to  receive  a  pension.  The  amount  of  a  person’s  pension  is  determined  by  how  long  he  or 
she  has  lived  in  Canada.    For  example,  a  person  who  has  lived  in  Canada  for  at  least  40  years  after  reaching  age  18 
may  qualify  for  a  full  OAS  pension.    The  benefit  is  pro-rated  for  pensioners  with  less  than  40  years  of  residence.   8
There  is  no  actuarial  adjustment  to  benefits  for  delaying  receipt  beyond  age  65.    Benefits 
are  fully  taxable,  and  since  1989  they  are  clawed  back  from  high  income  individuals.    A  special 
claw  back  tax  of  15  percent  comes  into  effect  as  a  beneficiary’s  income  reaches  $55,309  (in 
2001).    Finally,  benefits  have  been  fully  indexed  to  the  CPI  since  1972,  and  are  financed  out  of 
general  tax  revenues.     
 
The  Guaranteed  Income  Supplement  and  Spouse’s  Allowance 
The  GIS,  established  in  1967,  is  an  (annually)  income  tested  benefit,  available  to  OAS 
pensioners.    The  are  separate  benefits  for  singles  and  individuals  living  in  couples.    The 
calculation  of  income  for  the  purposes  of  the  test  is  similar  to  that  used  for  the  income  tax,  with 
the  exclusion  of  OAS  benefits.    A  key  difference  is  that  income  for  the  GIS  and  SPA  is 
calculated  at  the  family  level.    The  tax  back  of  benefits  is  50  cents  for  each  dollar  of  income 
except  in  couples  where  the  partner  is  under  age  60  in  which  the  tax  back  is  25  cents  for  each 
dollar  of  income. 
The  SPA,  established  in  1975,  is  a  program  for  partners  of  OAS  pensioners,  who  are 
between  the  ages  of  60  and  64.
4    The  maximum  benefit  is  equal  to  the  sum  of  the  current  OAS 
benefit  and  current  GIS  benefit  at  the  married  rate.    Benefits  are  income  tested  at  higher  rates 
than  the  GIS.    The  tax  on  benefits  is  75  cents  for  each  dollar  of  income  until  an  amount 
equivalent  to  the  OAS  benefit  has  been  retrieved.    At  this  point  the  tax  is  reduced:  the  sum  of  the 
remaining  SPA  benefit  and  the  other  partner’s  GIS  benefits  are  reduced  by  50  cents  for  each 
dollar  of  additional  income.    In  1986  the  SPA  was  extended  to  individuals  aged  60  to  64  who  had 
been  widowed  and  had  not  remarried.  Benefits  for  these  surviving  spouses  are  somewhat  larger 
but  are  taxed  back  similarly.   9
Both  GIS  and  SPA  benefits  are  fully  indexed  to  increases  in  the  CPI.    Furthermore, 
neither  benefit  is  subject  to  income  taxes  at  the  federal  or  provincial  levels. 
 
The  Canada  and  Quebec  Pension  Plans 
The  third  component  of  the  IS  system  is  the  QPP  and  CPP  which  were  established  in 
1966.    The  two  programs  are  largely  identical,  and  serve,  respectively,  individuals  living  in  the 
province  of  Quebec  and  individuals  living  in  the  other  provinces  and  territories  of  the  country. 
The  primary  difference  between  the  CPP/QPP  and  the  OAS  and  GIS/SPA  programs  is  that 
CPP/QPP  benefits  are  determined  by  an  individual’s  lifetime  work  history. 
The  plans  are  financed  by  a  payroll  tax  of  4.3  percent  (2001)  paid  by  both  employers  and 
employees.    The  tax  is  levied  on  employment  earnings  in  excess  of  the  Year’s  Basic  Exemption, 
currently  frozen  at  $3,500,  up  the  Year’s  Maximum  Pensionable  Earnings  (YMPE),  which 
equalled  $38,300  in  2001.    The  YMPE  is  indexed  to  the  growth  in  average  earnings  in  the  labour 
market. 
To  be  eligible  for  benefits,  an  individual  must  have  made  at  least  one  year  of 
contributions  in  his/her  contributory  period.    The  contributory  period  starts  at  age  18  or  January 
1,  1966,  whichever  is  later,  and  normally  extends  to  age  65  or  commencement  of  the  retirement 
pension,  whichever  is  earlier. 
Benefit  entitlement  is  determined  by  a  series  of  calculations.  In  the  first,  the  number  of 
months  in  an  individual’s  contributory  period  is  calculated.
5    Some  months  are  excluded.    They 
include  any  months  in  which  a  disability  pension  was  received,  months  spent  caring  for  children 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
4  Beneficiaries  must  also  meet  residency  requirements. 
5  Earnings  in  excess  of  1/12  of  the  YMPE  in  a  given  month  can  be  used,  if  necessary,  to  “top  up”  earnings  in  other 
months  in  the  same  calendar  year.       10
under  the  age  of  7
6,  any  month  between  age  65  and  the  commencement  of  the  pension
7  and  15 
percent  of  the  remaining  months.    These  last  three  conditions  are  subject  to  the  proviso  that  the 
total  contributory  period  cannot  fall  below  120  months.  In  the  second  calculation,  pensionable 
earnings  in  each  of  the  remaining  months  is  converted  to  current  earnings  by  multiplying  by  the 
ratio  of  the  YMPE  in  the  given  month  to  a  five  year  moving  average  of  the  YMPE  in  the  month 
of  application.
8  In  the  final  calculation,  the  product  of  0.25  and  the  average  of  this  real  earnings 
history,
9  called  Average  Pensionable  Earnings  (APE),  determine  benefit  entitlement. 
Benefits  can  be  claimed  at  any  age  between  60  and  70  subject  to  an  actuarial  adjustment.   
The  “normal”  retirement  age  is  65.    Benefits  are  reduced  (increased)  by  0.5  percent  for  each 
month  the  benefit  application  precedes  (succeeds)  this  age.
10    Benefit  receipt  prior  to  age  65  is 
conditional  on  a  retirement  test.  Annual  earnings  in  the  year  the  pension  is  claimed  cannot 
exceed  the  maximum  retirement  pension  payable  at  age  65  for  that  year.  This  test  is  only  applied 
at  the  point  of  application,  however;  after  that  point,  there  is  no  additional  check  on  the 
individual's  earnings. 
While  CPP/QPP  retirement  pensions  are  based  on  an  individual’s  earnings  record,  there 
is  some  dependence  of  benefits  across  partners  through  the  surviving  spouse  benefits.    This  is 
because  part  of  the  surviving  spouse  benefit  is  determined  by  the  deceased’s  earnings  history.
11   
These  programs  also  pay  benefits  to  orphaned  children  and  a  death  benefit. 
                                                                                                                    
6  If  the  individual  had  zero  or  below  average  earnings  in  these  months. 
7  Months  worked  between  the  ages  of  65  and  70  can  be  substituted  for  months  prior  to  age  65    if  they  increase 
benefit  entitlement.     
8  The  moving  average  is  calculated  as  the  year  of  application  and  the  preceding  four  years.    The  method  of 
calculation  has  been  in  place  since  1999.    Prior  to  1998,  a  three  year  moving  average  was  used.    In  1998  a  four  year 
moving  average  was  used. 
9  The  factor  of  0.25  has  been  in  place  since  1976.    In  the  period  1967  through  1975  the  ratio  was  increased  linearly 
from  0.025  to  this  level. 
10  This  early  retirement  option  has  been  available  from  the  QPP  since  1984  and  from  the  CPP  since  1987. 
11  Further  details  of  the  surviving  spouse  pension  can  be  found  CCH  Canadian  Ltd  (2001)  and  Baker,  Hanna  and 
Kantarevic  (2001).       11
The  CPP/QPP  also  provide  disability  pensions  to  individuals  who  are  unable  to  work  due 
to  disability.    This  dimension  of  the  program  may  have  some  impact  on  the  retirement  decision, 
as  there  is  speculation  in  the  literature  that  older  workers  use  disability  program  as  a  bridge  to 
retirement.
12 
Finally,  CPP/QPP  benefits  have  been  fully  indexed  to  the  CPP  since  1972.    They  are  also 
fully  taxable  under  federal  and  provincial  income  tax  laws. 
 
Other  Elements  of  the  Environment 
While  our  focus  in  this  paper  is  the  incentives  in  the  IS  programs,  there  are  a  number  of 
other  programs  that  are  inputs  to  the  retirement  decision.    The  first  is  provincially  run  programs 
for  seniors.  These  tend  to  be  relatively  small  programs  and  benefits  are  often  means  tested.
13 
The  second  element  is  employer  provided  pensions  or  Registered  Pension  Plans  (RPP’s).   
In    1997  almost  42  percent  of  paid  workers  were  participants  in  one  of  these  plans.    Recent 
trends  have  been  lower  in  coverage  and  away  from  defined  benefit  (DB)  plans  in  favour  of 
defined  contribution  (DC)  plans.    Both  types  of  plans  can  affect  retirement  decisions,  DC  plans 
primarily  through  income  effects,  while  DB  plans  can  have  quite  complex  incentive  effects.   
Relative  to  public  pension  plans,  employer  pensions  are  relatively  understudied  due  to  a  lack  of 
data.
14 
A  third  element  is  the  tax  deferred  saving  program  called  Registered  Retirement  Savings 
Plans  (RRSP).    This  program  allows  individuals  to  save  up  to  18%  of  earned  income,  to 
maximum  of  $13,500  on  a  pretax  basis.    This  so-called  contribution  room  is  reduced  by  a 
                                                                                                                    
12  Further  information  on  the  CPP  and  QPP  disability  programs  can  be  found  in  Gruber  (2000).     
13  For  example,  The  GAINS  program  in  Ontario  ‘tops  up’  the  GIS  for  seniors  by  a  maximum  of  $83.  In  2000, 
approximately  8  percent  of  Ontario  OAS  receipients  received  GAINS. 
14  Gunderson  and  Pesando  (1988,  1991)  outline  the  incentives  in  some  Canadian  RPPs.   12
Pension  Adjustment  for  individuals  who  participate  in  a  RPP.    The  Pension  Adjustment  is  equal 
to  the  actual  contributions  to  a  DC  plan  and  deemed  annual  contribution  for  individuals 
participating  in  a  DB  plan.    Assets  in  RRSP’s  accumulate  tax  free,  but  are  fully  taxable  on 
withdrawal,  which  must  commence  by  age  69.    While  RRSP’s  are  primarily  a  vehicle  for  savings 
and  tax  deferral,  for  the  retirement  decision  they  can  interact  with  income  tested  programs  like 
the  GIS.    RRSP  distributions  are  income  for  the  purposes  of  the  GIS/SPA  income  tests  and  OAS 
clawbacks,  and  so  will  face  very  high  tax  rates  for  some  individuals. 
   
III.  The  Data 
Lack  of  adequate  panel  data  has  presented  obstacles  to  retirement  research  in   
Canada.    Proper  modelling  of  retirement  incentives  requires  a  panel  data  set  of  older  workers  that 
contains  sufficient  information,  in  particular  full  earnings  histories,  to  accurately  calculate  their 
entitlements  to  IS  programs.    In  this  study  we  make  use  of  a  unique  administrative  data  set  which 
possesses  many  of  these  characteristics. 
The  starting  point  is  the  Longitudinal  Worker  File  (LWF)  developed  by  the  Business  and 
Labour  Market  Analysis  (BLMA)  Division  of  Statistics  Canada.
15    It  is  a  10  percent  random 
sample  of  Canadian  workers  for  the  period  1978-1996.  These  data  are  the  product  of  information 
from  three  administrative  data  files:  the  T-4  file  of  Revenue  Canada,  the  Record  of  Employment 
(ROE)  file  of  Human  Resources  Development  Canada  and  the  Longitudinal  Employment 
Analysis  Program  (LEAP)  file  of  BLMA.  The  LWF  data  also  provide  information  on  each 
                                                                                                                    
15  The  construction  of  the  database  is  described  in  Picot  and  Lin,  (1997)  and  Statistics  Canada  (1998).  Our 
description  draws  heavily  on  these  sources.   13
individual’s  age  and  sex.    These  were  established  from  the  T-1  tax  returns  which  individuals  file 
each  year.
16   
The  T-4  file  supplies  the  earnings  data.    T-4  tax  forms  are  issued  annually  by  employers 
for  any  employment  earnings  that  (1)  exceed  a  certain  annual  threshold  and/or  (2)  trigger  income 
tax,  contributions  to  Canada’s  public  pension  plans,  or  unemployment  insurance  premiums. 
These  data  therefore,  capture  any  employment  earnings  of  paid  employees,  as  well  as  the 
incorporated  unemployed.    Omitted  from  these  data  will  be  earnings  from  unincorporated  self 
employment.    The  consequences  of  this  deficiency  are  discussed  below.    The  data  also  establish 
a  province  of  residency  for  the  individual,  through  the  location  from  where  the  T-4  was  issued.
17 
Employers  issue  ROE  forms  to  employees  in  insurable  employment
18  whenever  an 
earnings  interruption  occurs.  Earnings  interruptions  result  from  events  such  as  strikes,  layoffs, 
quits,  dismissals,  retirement  and  maternity  or  parental  leave.    The  reason  for  the  interruption  is 
recorded  on  the  ROE  form.    These  forms  are  the  source  of  measures  of  job  tenure  (starting  in 
1978)  at  a  given  establishment. 
Finally,  the  LEAP  is  a  longitudinal  data  file  on  Canadian  businesses  at  the  company 
level.    It  is  a  source  of  information  on  the  company  (employee)  size  and  3  digit  industry  of  the 
jobs  in  which  employee  work.    These  administrative  data  sources  allow  us  to  construct  a 
comprehensive  data  set  for  the  study  of  retirement  in  Canada. 
                                                                                                                    
16  To  obtain  this  information,  therefore,  it  is  necessary  that  he  or  she  filed  a  tax  return  at  least  once  in  the  sample 
period. 
17  T-4’s  for  some  individuals  will  be  issued  from  offices  that  are  not  in  their  province  of  residence.    It  is  not  possible 
to  assess  the  severity  of  this  problem. 
18  Over  the  sample  period,  insurable  employment  covers  most  employer-employee  relationships.    Exclusion 
includes  self-employed  workers,  full  time  students,  employees  who  work  less  than  15  hours  per  week  and  earn 
less  than  20  percent  of  maximum  weekly  insurable  earnings  (20  percent*$750=$150  in  1999).    Individuals 
working  in  insurable  employment  pay  Employment  Insurance  (EI)  contributions  on  their  earnings  and  are 
eligible  for  EI  benefits  subject  to  the  other  parameters  of  the  EI  program. 
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The  LWF  data  span  the  period  1978  through  1996.  Earnings  histories  of  this  length  are 
not  sufficient,  however,  to  establish  individuals’  entitlements  to  CPP/QPP  benefits.    Recall  that 
contributory  periods  can  span  back  to  as  early  as  1966.    The  years  1975  through  1977  are  filled 
in  by  reference  to  the  T-4  earnings  records  for  these  years.    T-4  records  for  the  years  1966 
through  1974,  however,  are  not  available.  To  predict  earnings  in  these  years,  cohort  specific 
earnings  growth  rates  calculated  from  the  1972,  1974  and  1976  census  family  files  of  the  Survey 
of  Consumer  Finance
19  were  applied  to  a  three  year  average  of  an  individual’s  last  valid  earnings 
observations  in  the  LWF  sample.    This  allows  us  to  construct  earnings  histories  back  unto  1971.   
For  the  remaining  five  years,  earnings  growth  rates  implied  by  a  cross  section  age  profile 
estimated  from  the  1972  SCF  are  used,  appropriately  discounted  for  inflation  and  productivity 
gains  using  the  Industrial  Composite  wage  for  the  period  1966-1970.
20 
The  marital  status  and  any  spouse/common-law  partners  of  individuals  are  identified 
through  reference  to  the  T-1  family  file  maintained  by  Statistics  Canada.    T-4  earnings  histories 
for  the  period  1966-1996  are  then  constructed  for  the  spouse/common-law  partners,  following 
the  procedures  used  for  the  sample  individuals. 
Finally,  two  additional  pieces  of  information  were  added  to  these  data.    First,  to 
determine  entitlement  for  income  tested  benefits,  we  need  information  on  non-labour  income.   
To  do  this  we  construct  age  profiles  of  family  level  income  by  sex/region/industry  and 
sex/region/marital  status  cells,  for  individuals  in  and  out  of  the  labour  market  respectively,
21 
using  data  from  the  1986  and  1991  census  family  files  of  the  Canadian  Census.        The  measure  of 
                                                                                                                    
19    We  use  samples  of  paid  workers  with  positive  earnings  in  the  relevant  birth  cohorts. 
20  The  data  on  the  Industrial  Composite  wage  are  from  Statistics  Canada  (1983).  The  obvious  limitation  of  this 
backcasting  approach  is  that  we  will  not  predict  absences  from  the  labour  market,  which  may  be  important  at 
younger  ages.    However,  the  youngest  cohort  in  our  analysis  was  30  in  1966.    This  means  that  absences  for  child 
bearing,  or  due  to  the  employment  instability  of  youth,  do  not  play  a  large  role  for  most  members  of  our  data  set. 
   15
non-labour  income  includes  investment  income  and  income  from  private  pensions.    We  then 
impute  non  labour  income  to  individuals  using  the  profile  appropriate  to  their  current  or 
(assumed)  future  labour  market  state.  The  sample  and  cell  definitions  that  are  employed  are  more 
fully  described  in  the  Appendix. 
Second,  information  on  the  probability  of  RPP  coverage,  by  3-digit  industry,
22  is 
computed  using  cross  section  samples  of  males  or  females  from  the  1986-1990  Labour  Market 
Activity  Survey  (LMAS)  and  the  1993-1996  Survey  of  Labour  and  Income  Dynamics  (SLID).   
In  these  surveys  individuals  are  asked  if  they  participate  in  any  RPP.    These  probabilities  are 
then  imputed  to  individuals  in  the  LWF,  matching  on  the  industry  codes.    Probabilities  for  the 
years  1991  and  1992  are  simple  linear  interpolations.    Again  the  sample  definitions  for  these  data 
sources  are  described  in  the  Appendix. 
Our  definitions  of  work  and  retirement  follow  from  fact  that  we  observe  the  earnings  of 
individuals  as  captured  on  the  T-4  forms,  but  have  no  direct  information  on  their  labour  market 
activity.  We  define  work  as  positive  T-4  earnings  in  two  consecutive  years.    If  we  observe   
positive  earnings  in  one  year  and  zero  earnings  in  the  next,  the  year  of  positive  earnings  is 
denoted  the  retirement  year.    As  noted  above,  T-4’s  are  not  issued  to  the  unincorporated  self-
employed  so  movements  from  paid  employment  into  this  sector  will  also  be  labelled  as 
retirement.
  23  These  mislabeled  transitions  induce  measurement  error  in  our  0/1  indicator  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
21    The  age  profiles  are  appropriately  inflated  by  the  CPI  for  use  in  future  years. 
 
22    Some  industries  are  aggregated  to  obtain  sufficient  sample  sizes.    Unfortunately,  the  sample  sizes  of  these  data 
sets  would  not  permit  us  to  calculate  these  probabilities  exclusively  for  older  individuals. 
23  In  1991,  a  year  in  the  middle  of  our  sample  period,  13.2  percent  of  working  males  and  6.8  percent  of  working 
females  aged  55  to  64  reported  themselves  as  unincorporated  self-employed  (1991  Public  Use  Micordata  Files  of  the 
Canadian  census).  Note  that  some  of  these  individuals  will  have  worked  in  this  sector  from  before  they  turned  55, 
and  so  will  never  appear  in  our  sample.    It  is  not  obvious  how  the  exclusion  of  this  group  might  affect  our 
conclusions.       16
retirement.    The  result  is  that  we  will  underestimate  the  marginal  effects  of  the  characteristics  of 
individuals  and  their  jobs,  as  well  as  the  IS  incentives,  on  the  probability  of  retirement.
24   
Only  the  first  observed  “retirement”  for  each  individual  is  considered.    If  a  person  re-
enters  the  labour  market  after  a  year  of  zero  earnings,  the  later  observations  are  not  used.    Labour 
market  return  is  potentially  an  important  topic,  but  outside  the  scope  of  the  current  analysis.   
Furthermore,  first  retirements  may  be  more  important  from  the  perspective  of  the  fiscal  health  of 
various  IS  programs.    Finally,  individuals  are  only  followed  until  age  64.    Therefore,  an 
individual  who  has  positive  earnings  in  every  year  up  to  age  64  will  pass  out  of  our  sample 
before  we  observe  their  retirement,  and  contribute  a  censored  observation.    The  age  64  cutoff 
makes  sense  given  that  there  is  mandatory  retirement  at  this  age  in  most  jurisdictions  in  Canada 
over  the  period  we  examine. 
Given  we  identify  the  year  proceeding  a  year  of  zero  earnings  as  the  retirement  year,  the 
focus  of  our  analysis  is  the  period  1985-1995.    We  draw  separate  samples  of  males  and  females 
aged  55  through  65  who  worked  in  1985.  Each  individual  contributes  observations  from  this  year 
to  the  year  of  retirement  or  age  64,  whichever  comes  first.    Younger  cohorts  of  individuals  are 
added  as  they  turn  55  in  the  years  1986-1991  again  conditional  on  working  in  that  year.
25 
26    The 
sample  is  selected  conditional  on  working  so  that  the  incentives  for  retirement  conditional  on 
being  in  the  labour  force  are  examined.    While  it  makes  sense  to  insist  on  some  initial  labour 
market  activity  in  an  analysis  of  retirement,  our  requirement  of  earnings  in  a  given  one-year 
                                                                                                                    
24  This  conclusion  follows  from  the  observations  that  our  retirement  indicator  is  dichotomous  (i.e.,  0/1)  and  the 
measurement  error  is  not  “classical”.    Furthermore,  the  error  is  “one-sided”  in  that  we  may  mistakenly  code  a  “0”  as 
a  “1”  when  someone  enters  unincorporated  self-employment,  but  we  will  not  miscode  “1’s”  as  “0’s”,  since  we 
define  working  as  receiving  a  T-4  form.    In  this  case,  there  is  attenuation  bias  in  the  estimated  marginal  effects.    See 
Hausman,  Abrevaya,  and  Scott-Morton  (1998). 
25  Individuals  with  missing  age,  sex  or  province  variables  are  excluded. 
26  Agricultural  workers  and  individuals  in  other  primary  industries  are  excluded.  We  make  this  exclusion  because 
our  definitions  of  retirement  are  based  on  earnings,  and  the  earnings  streams  for  these  workers,  given  high  rates  of   17
interval  will  exclude  individuals  who  retain  some  attachment  to  the  labour  market  but  who 
experience  an  extended  period  of  joblessness.
27 
 
IS  Incentive  Variables 
Our  analysis  requires  careful  construction  of  each  individual’s  IS  incentives.    The  starting 
point  is  an  individual’s  IS  entitlement.    We  calculate  entitlement  on  a  family  rather  than  an 
individual  basis,  so  we  also  must  calculate  the  IS  entitlement  of  any  spouse  and  common  law 
partner,  in  a  given  year.    The  calculations  incorporate  all  components  of  the  federal  IS  system. 
OAS  eligibility  is  primarily  determined  by  age,  which  we  observe  directly  in  the  data.   
Two  complications  are  the  residency  requirement  and  the  benefit  clawback.  The  residency 
requirement  is  not  implemented  because  we  lack  information  on  place  of  birth  and  year  of  arrival 
in  Canada.    The  clawback  provisions  (starting  in  1989)  are  fully  implemented,  however,  based 
on  projections  of  labour  and  non-labour  income. 
Eligibility  for  the  GIS/SPA  is  determined  by  age  and  family  income.    Age  is  observed  in 
our  data.    We  also  implement  the  income  test  based  on  projections  of  labour  and  non-labour 
income. 
We  determine  CPP/QPP  entitlement  using  individuals  T-4  and  projected  earnings 
histories  as  described  above.    The  drop  out  provisions  for  low  earnings  months  up  to  15  percent 
of  the  contributory  period  are  fully  implemented.    Disabilities  or  time  spent  in  childcare  are  not 
observed,  however,  and  therefore  deletions  for  these  reasons  are  not  captured.
28  The  reforms  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
self-employment  and  special  provisions  in  the  Employment  Insurance  system  for  fishers  and  other  seasonal  workers, 
are  difficult  to  interpret. 
27  Depending  on  when  the  period  of  joblessness  falls  in  the  calendar  year,  our  sample  captures  all  individuals  whose 
period  lasts  11  months  or  less,  and  some  individuals  whose  period  is  as  long  as  22  months. 
 
28  Note  that  the  dropout  provisions  for  childcare  came  in  to  effect  in  1977  under  the  QPP  and  1978  under  the  CPP.   
The  childbearing  years  of  many  females  in  our  sample  will  have  been  prior  to  these  dates.   18
the  CPP/QPP  system  over  the  period  are  also  accounted  for,  including  the  introduction  of  early 
retirement,  the  retirement  test  on  benefit  receipt  at  ages  60-64  and  the  actuarial  adjustment  to 
benefits  for  initiating  benefit  receipt  at  ages  other  than  65,  in  1984  and  1987  respectively.    Note, 
however,  that  the  disability  benefit  is  not  included  in  this  calculation,  nor  is  any  child  benefit 
(either  disability  related  or  survivor)  as  there  is  no  information  on  children  in  the  data  set. 
IS  entitlement  is  calculated  for  both  current  and  future  years.    To  do  this  we  require  a 
projection  of  individuals’  (and  their  spouse/common-law  partners’)  potential  labour  and  non-
labour  income  in  future  years.    After  experimenting  with  a  number  of  projection  methods, 
earnings  are  projected  by  applying  a  real  growth  rate  of  zero  percent  per  year  to  the  average  of  an 
individual’s  observed  earnings  in  the  three  years  preceding  the  retirement  year.
29  Non  labour 
income  is  projected  following  the  method  outlined  above.    For  each  individual,  entitlement  with 
and  without  the  imputed  level  of  non-labour  income  is  calculated  and  then  averaged  using  as 
weights  the  cell  specific  probability  that  non-labour  income  is  positive.    Both  projected  earnings 
and  non-labour  income  are  net  of  federal  and  provincial  income  taxes.    Also  deducted  are  the 
employee’s  portion  of  the  CPP/QPP  payroll  tax  that  they  would  pay  if  they  worked.    In  either 
case  the  tax  provisions  of  the  year  in  which  the  calculation  is  made  are  assumed  to  be  in  effect  in 
all  future  years. 
Since  IS  entitlement  is  calculated  at  the  family  level  we  require  some  assumption  about 
any  spouse/common  law  partner’s  retirement  decision.    A  complete  model  of  family  labour 
supply  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.    The  simplifying  assumption  made  here  is  that  any 
                                                                                                                    
29  Within  sample  evaluation  revealed  this  method  a  better  predictor  (in  a  mean-squared  error  sense)  of  future 
earnings  than  methods  involving  a  projection  equation  that  included  demographic  variables,  lagged  earnings  and 
individual  fixed  effects.   19
partner  starts  collecting  entitlements  at  the  earliest  age  possible  under  the  current  rules  of  IS 
programs.
30       
Once  these  calculations  are  completed  we  construct  the  expected  net  present  value  of  the 
family’s  Income  Security  Wealth  (ISW)  associated  with  each  retirement  date.    For  single 
workers  this  is  the  sum  of  future  benefits  discounted  backwards  by  time  preference  and  survival 
probabilities  for  each  possible  year  of  retirement.    For  married  workers  we  account  for  the 
likelihood  of  the  joint  survival  of  worker  and  the  spouse/common-law  partner,  and  the  survivor 
provisions  of  the  CPP/QPP  and  the  SPA,  as  described  in  more  detail  in  Gruber  (1999).    We  use  a 
real  discount  rate  of  3  percent  and  survival  probabilities  from  the  age/sex  specific  Canadian  life 
tables  from  Statistics  Canada  (Statistics  Canada  1984). 
The  result  is  a  profile  of  the  present  discounted  value  (PDV)  of  ISW  at  all  possible 
retirement  dates.    This  allows  us  to  construct  three  different  incentive  variables  that  are  current  in 
the  literature.     
The  first,  and  most  commonly  used,  is  the  one  year  accrual  which  is  simply  the  difference 
of  ISW  between  adjacent  retirement  ages.    It  reveals  the  effect  of  choosing  to  work  an  additional 
year. 
The  second  is  the  peak  value  accrual  introduced  by  Coile  and  Gruber  (2000).    This  is  the 
difference  between  ISW  at  the  current  age  and  ISW  at  the  financially  optimal  retirement  age,  the 
age  at  which  ISW  is  maximized.    Relative  to  the  one  year  accrual  the  peak  value  calculation   
                                                                                                                    
30  For  most  of  the  sample  period  this  is  age  65  for  OAS  and  GIS,  age  60  for  the  Allowance  and  age  60  for  the 
CPP/QPP.  For  CPP/QPP  benefits  prior  to  age  65  and  any  income-tested  benefit,  the  assumption  implies  a  cessation 
of  the  spouse/common-law  partner’s  employment  (i.e.,  retirement).    Gruber  (1999)  and  Baker  and  Benjamin  (2000) 
provide  estimates  of  age/employment  profiles  and  employment  hazards  (the  conditional  probability  of  labour  market 
exit)  for  older  men  and  women  over  the  sample  period.    This  evidence  provides  some  justification  for  this 
assumption  about  labour  market  exit  rates  in  our  analysis  of  the  male  sample,  in  which  the  spouse/common-law 
partners  are  females.        On  the  other  hand,  this  assumption  may  prematurely  remove  the  male  spouse/common-law 
partners  of  individuals  in  our  sample  of  females  from  the  labour  market.    This  is  unlikely  to  have  a  large  effect  on   20
accommodates  non-linearities  in  the  PDV  of  ISW  profile.    This  captures  the  idea  that  continued 
work  preserves  an  option  to  retire  in  the  future,  which  is  valuable  if  there  are  significant 
increases  in  ISW  at  later  ages.    After  the  optimal  retirement  age  the  peak  value  calculation 
collapses  to  the  one  year  accrual. 
The  final  measure  is  the  option  value  accrual  of  Stock  and  Wise  (1990).    Similar  to  the 
peak  value  calculation,  the  comparison  is  of  the  current  age  to  an  optimal  retirement  age  in  the 
future,  which  is  defined  in  terms  of  utility  rather  than  in  terms  of  dollars  of  ISW.    To  implement 
this  calculation  we  adopt  the  indirect  utility  function  used  by  Stock  and  Wise,  but  directly 
parameterize  it  rather  than  estimating  its  parameters.  The  individual’s  indirect  utility  function  is 
assumed  to  be   
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where    R  is  the  retirement  date,  d  is  the  discount  rate,  p  is  the  probability  of  being  alive  at  some 
future  date  conditional  on  being  alive  today,  y  is  income  while  working,  B  is  retirement  benefits, 
g  is  the  parameter  of  risk  aversion,    k  is  a  parameter  to  account  for  disutility  of  labour  ( ) 1 ³ k   and 
T  is  maximum  life  length.  Following  Stock  and  Wise  (1990),  we  set  k=1.5  and  g=0.75,  and  set 
d=0.03  following  Coile  and  Gruber  (2000).    Sensitivity  analysis  suggests  that  the  results  are  not 
dramatically  different  for  sensible  variations  in  these  parameter  values.    Relative  to  the  peak 
value  measure,  the  option  value  accrual  provides  a  specific  economic  rational  for  the  optimal 
retirement  date  accounting  for  the  disutility  of  work  and  value  of  leisure.    Its  primary 
disadvantages  are  its  (possibly  incorrect)  assumed  specification  of  the  indirect  utility  function, 
and  that  earnings  enter  directly  into  the  utility  calculation  and  thus  will  drive  some  part  of  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
our  estimates,  as  the  independence  across  spouse/common-law  partners  in  determination  of  most  of  the  benefits 
means  that  spousal  retirement  is  only  a  minor  contributor  to  IS  incentive  calculations.   21
variation  of  the  option  value  across  individuals.    If  earnings  are  in  turn  correlated  with  some 
unobserved  component  of  tastes  for  retirement,  the  identification  of  the  option  value  effects  can 
be  problematic. 
 
IV.    Empirical  Framework 
Our  estimating  equation  relates  the  retirement  decisions  of  individuals  to  their 
demographic  and  economic  characteristics  as  well  as  their  ISW.    Both  the  level  of  ISW  and  the 
different  incentive  variables  enter  the  equation.    The  level  captures  wealth  effects:  more  wealth 
through  IS  programs  will  lead  to  increased  consumption  of  all  goods,  including  leisure,  if  leisure 
is  a  normal  good.    The  incentive  variables  capture  a  substitution  effect:  if  there  is  a  large 
financial  incentive  to  additional  years  of  work,  then  individuals  will  retire  later.      The  equation 
estimated  is: 
(2)   
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where  it R   is  a  variable  which  equals  one  in  the  year  of  retirement  and  0  otherwise,  ` it ISW is  the 
expected  PDV  of  ISW  in  year  t,  it ACC   is  one  of  the  incentive  variables  outlined  above, it AGE  
represents  a  set  of  dummy  variables  for  each  age  in  our  sample,  and  a  measure  of  the  difference 
in  ages  across  spouse/common-law  partners,  it EARN   and  it APE   represent  cubics  in  measures  of 
the  individual’s  projected  earnings  in  year  t  and  his/her  Average  Pensionable  Earnings  (for 
CPP/QPP  calculations),  it SPEARN   and  it SPAPE   are  the  corresponding  variables  of  any 
spouse/common-law  partner,  it RPP   is  the  measure  of  the  probability  of  RPP  coverage  at  the  3-  22
digit  industry  level,
31  and it X   are  a  set  of  additional  control  variables,  including  a  dummy 
variable  for  marital  status,  a  quadratic  in  tenure  on  the  job  and  a  dummy  variable  which  equals 
one  if  tenure  is  censored  at  1978,
32  a  quadratic  in  the  individual’s  and  his/her  spouse/common-
law  partner’s  labour  market  experience  measured  as  the  number  of  years  of  positive  T-4  earnings 
between  1975  and  year  t,  11  industry  dummies,  dummies  for  6  categories  of  establishment  size 
and  province  and  year  effects.        To  capture  potential  non-linear  relationships  between  earnings 
and  retirement  decisions,  a  full  set  of  interactions  between  the  cubics  in  it EARN   and  it APE ,  and 
it SPEARN   and  it SPAPE   are  included.    The  equations  are  estimated  separately  for  males  and 
females  as  a  probit. 
 
V.    Results 
Descriptive  Statistics 
Descriptive  statistics  for  the  male  and  female  samples  are  presented  in  table  1  (a  full  set 
of  variable  definitions  is  provided  in  the  Appendix).    We  have  550,839  observations  on  110,972 
males,  and  347,775  observations  on  71,066  females.    On  average,  therefore,  we  observe  about 
five  observations  for  each  individual.  The  means  are  calculated  over  observations  in  the  sample, 
rather  than  individuals.    This  has  implications  for  the  interpretation  of  some  of  the  statistics.    For 
example,  the  probability  of  RPP  coverage  is  higher  than  estimates  of  RPP  participation  in  the 
population  (see  above),  but  make  sense  if  individuals  with  high  probabilities  of  RPP  coverage 
have  more  stable  employment  careers  and  therefore  add  more  observations  to  the  sample.   
                                                                                                                    
31      The  standard  errors  here  are  potentially  biased  due  to  a  correlation  of  the  error  term  across  individuals  within  3-
digit  industry  (the  “grouped  data  problem”).  Correcting  for  this  bias  would  lead  to  larger  estimated  standard  errors 
on  the  parameter  on  RPP. 
32    Again,  the  quadratic  specification  allows  a  more  flexible  affect  of  tenure  on  the  retirement  decision  than  a  linear 
specification.    In  the  LWF,  the  tenure  variable  begins  counting  in  1978.    Therefore,  an  individual  observed  in  the   23
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  observations  come  from  comparisons  of  the  male  and  female 
results.    The  females  have  lower  projected  earnings  and  estimated  APE  as  might  be  expected,  but 
tenure  and  experience  are  quite  similar  for  the  two  sexes.    This  is  likely  because  our  tenure  and 
experience  measures  are  censored  in  year  1978  and  1975  respectively.    Presumably  if  we  could 
observe  tenure  and  experience  over  the  full  working  life  the  results  would  be  lower  for  females.   
Also,  the  baseline  retirement  rates  are  quite  similar  for  males  and  females.    Females  are  less 
likely  to  work  at  the  sample  ages,  but  conditional  on  working  at  age  55  display  similar  retirement 
patterns.
33     
The  hazard  rates  to  retirement  in  our  sample  are  presented  in  Figures  2  and  3  for  males 
and  females  respectively.    For  both  sexes  the  hazards  are  relatively  flat  through  the  50’s  leading 
to  a    jump  at  age  60.    This  is  the  first  age  that  individuals  can  claim  CPP/QPP  benefits.    For 
males  the  hazard  continues  to  rise  through  the  60s,  with  another  pronounced  jump  at  age  64,  the 
age  before  mandatory  retirement  in  many  jurisdictions.    For  females  the  hazard  levels  off  at  ages 
61  through  63,  and  then  jumps  up  at  age  64,  as  in  the  male  sample. 
In  table  2  we  present  summaries  of  our  incentive  measures  by  age.    We  report  the  median 
value,  as  well  as  the  10
th  and  90
th  percentiles  and  standard  deviation  to  give  some  indication  of 
their  variation.    For  both  males  and  females  the  one  year  accrual  is  positive  at  the  median  until 
age  60,  but  then  turns  sharply  negative.    This  implies  that  there  is  an  incentive  to  retire  and  start 
drawing  IS  benefits  at  age  61.    Given  that  the  main  IS  program  available  at  this  age,  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
same  job  between,  for  example,  1978  and  1985,  has  tenure  of  at  least  7  years.    The  dummy  variable  for  this 
censoring  helps  account  for  the  uncertainty  about  the  exact  tenure. 
33  For  example,  in  the  1998  Survey  of  Consumer  Finance  data  65  percent  of  males  aged  55-59  were  working  in  the 
survey  week  compared  to  46  percent  of  females.    For  ages  60  to  64  the  rates  are  39  percent  and  23  percent 
respectively.   24
CPP/QPP,  has  a  retirement  test,  responding  to  this  incentive  would  entail  some  sort  of  separation 
from  the  current  job.
34     
The  one  year  accrual  represents  the  change  in  ISW  for  an  additional  year  of  work.    There 
are  a  number  of  features  of  the  IS  system  that  determine  whether  it  is  positive  or  negative.    For 
example,  ISW  could  increase  through  the  dropout  provisions  of  the  CPP/QPP:  an  additional  year 
of  work  may  replace  a  poor  earnings  year,  or  15  percent  of  poor  years  between  ages  60  and  64, 
in  the  benefit  entitlement  calculation.
35    This  effect  is  attenuated  in  the  years  we  examine, 
however,  due  to  the  low  real  value  of  the  YMPE  in  the  1970’s.    Set  in  1966  to  equal  average 
earnings,  the  YMPE  fell  to  as  low  as  67  percent  of  the  Industrial  Composite  wage  by  1973.    In 
1975  the  YMPE  was  set  on  course  to  equal  the  Industrial  Composite  again,  but  this  did  not 
happen  until  1987.    The  result  is  that  poor  earnings  years  during  this  period  may  still  have  been 
good  years  relative  to  the  YMPE,  which  is  what  matters  for  benefits  calculation.  Therefore,  it  is 
less  likely  they  would  be  dominated  by  earnings  in  years  after  the  YMPE  had  regained  its  value.     
Another  factor  is  the  actuarial  adjustment  to  benefits  starting  at  age  60.    While  the 
adjustment  is  intended,  on  average,  to  keep  the  PDV  of  benefits  constant  across  retirement  ages, 
it  is  unlikely  that  the  linear  structure  of  the  adjustment  in  the  CPP/QPP  achieves  this  purpose.   
Furthermore,  the  actuarial  adjustment  interacts  with  the  income  testing  of  GIS  and  SPA  benefits 
for  some  individuals.    Higher  CPP/QPP  benefits  available  by  delaying  retirement  are  partially 
offset  by  lower  GIS  entitlement  (at  age  65)  through  the  income  test.    Therefore,  the  income  test 
acts  like  a  tax  on  those  features  of  the  CPP/QPP  that  adjust  the  pension  entitlement  with 
continued  work.  In  August  2001,  34.6  percent  of  OAS  pensioners  received  some  GIS  benefits. 
                                                                                                                    
34  The  SPA  would  also  be  available  to  those  eligible. 
35  If  the  earnings  in  the  extra  year  of  work  are  higher  than  the  lowest  earnings  currently  included  in  the  CPP 
entitlement  calculation,  then  the  extra  year  of  work  will  replace  the  low  earnings  year.    Between  the  ages  of  60  and   25
The  initial  positive  values  at  the  median  (ages  55  through  60)  show  how  the  drop  out 
provisions  can  increase  the  PDV  of  ISW.    Starting  at  age  60  however,  the  lower  value  of  the  drop 
out’s  and  the  interaction  of  the  actuarial  adjustment  with  the  means  testing  of  the  OAS/GIS/SPA 
turns  the  median  negative.    Median  accrual  falls  to  -$4440  for  males  and  -$3404  for  females  by 
age  64.    Note  also  that  the  percentiles  and  variance  reveal  considerable  variation  in  the  one-year 
accrual  across  individuals.    It  is  effectively  zero  by  age  56  at  the  10
th  percentile,  but  remains 
positive  through  age  65  at  the  90
th. 
The  peak  value  accrual  displays  a  similar  patter  to  the  one  year  accrual,  turning  from 
positive  to  negative  at  age  61.    As  seen  in  the  one-year  accrual  results  there  are  no  strong  non-
linearities  at  the  median,  so  the  peak  value  calculation  does  not  convey  much  additional 
information.    Also,  note  that  the  peak  value  and  one  year  statistics  are  identical  once  the  one-year 
accrual  turns  negative. 
Finally  in  the  last  columns  are  the  statistics  for  the  option  value  accrual.    They  are  in  units 
of  utility  and  so  are  hard  to  interpret.    Their  most  important  characteristic  is  that  in  contrast  to  the 
two  other  measures,  the  option  value  accrual  remains  positive,  at  the  median  and  1
st  and  9
th 
deciles,  throughout  the  age  range.    This  reflects  the  fact  that  the  optimal  retirement  age  at  the 
median  is  about  age  71. 
 
Results 
In  table  3  we  report  estimates  of  equation  (1)  for  males.  Moving  across  blocks  we  vary 
the  incentive  measures,  while  moving  across  columns  within  blocks  we  sequentially  add  control 
variables  to  the  estimating  equation.    The  results  in  the  first  block  are  for  the  one-year  accrual.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
64,  an  extra  year  of  work  also  extends  the  contributory  period,  which  entitles  the  worker  to  drop  out  more  low 
earning  periods.    Fifteen  percent  of  the  earning  periods  in  the  contributory  period  may  be  dropped  out.       26
In  the  first  column  (specification  1)  there  are  no  other  control  variables  so  the  IS  variables  can 
have  their  maximum  impact.    The  estimate  for  the  level  of  ISW  is,  surprisingly,  negative, 
suggesting  that  leisure  is  an  inferior  good.  One  explanation  of  this  result  is  an  omitted  variable.   
For  example,  higher  lifetime  earners  will  have  higher  levels  of  ISW,  but  also  may  have  greater 
preferences  for  work.    The  accrual  variable  has  the  expected  negative  sign  and  is  quite  large.    A 
$1000  increase  in  accrual  lowers  the  retirement  rate  by  2.4  percentage  points,  which  can  be 
compared  to  a  baseline  retirement  rate  in  the  male  sample  of  12.2  precent  (table  1). 
In  the  next  column  we  add  the  demographic  controls,  industry,  province  and  year  effects, 
the  firm  size  dummies  and  simple  (linear)  controls  for  age.    The  result  is  a  marginal  reduction  in 
the  effect  of  the  incentive  variable.    Note  also  that  the  estimated  effect  of  the  level  of  ISW 
continues  to  be  negative  but  is  just  over  half  its  previous  value. 
In  the  third  column  we  replace  the  linear  age  controls  with  a  full  set  of  age  dummies.   
These  will  potentially  soak  up  omitted  institutional  features  of  the  environment  as  well  as  any 
age  specific  preferences  in  a  more  flexible  way.    The  result  is  again  marginal  changes  in  the 
inference  (relative  to  the  first  column).     
In  the  fourth  column  we  add  the  cubics  in  own  and  spouse’s  projected  earnings  and  APE, 
as  well  as  the  interactions  between  the  two.  This  is  potentially  an  important  innovation  because 
ISW  is  mechanically  a  function  of  past  earnings,  and  accrual  depends  on  projected  earnings,  but 
both  of  these  measures  of  earnings  may  have  independent  effects  on  retirement.  In  our  results, 
we  do  observe  quite  substantial  changes  in  inference.    First,  the  estimated  parameter  on  the  level 
of  ISW  is  now  positive  as  expected.    This  suggests  that  in  previous  specifications,  ISW  was 
picking  up  some  independent  effect  of  earnings  on  retirement.    An  additional  $10,000  in  ISW  is 
estimated  to  increase  the  retirement  rate  by  0.15  percentage  points;  the  expected  wealth  effect.       27
Second,  the  estimate  on  the  one  year  accrual  variable  is  now  dramatically  smaller.    An 
additional  $1000  of  accrual  decreases  the  retirement  rate  by  only  0.89  percentage  points 
compared  to  2.4  percentage  points  in  specification  1.    This  change  in  inference  is  consistent  then 
with  the  evidence  of  Coile  and  Gruber  (2000)  who  use  a  similar  specification,  and  Chan  and 
Stevens  (2001)  who  compare  simple  estimates  and  fixed  effects  estimates.
36    The  incentive 
effects  of  the  IS  system  would  appear  to  be  considerably  over  estimated  in  specifications  which 
do  not  attempt  some  control  for  omitted  factors  which  are  correlated  with  lifetime  earnings  and 
individuals’  propensities  for  work. 
A  corresponding  set  of  results  for  the  peak  value  accrual  is  presented  in  the  succeeding 
columns  of  the  next  block.    There  are  some  strong  similarities  to  the  one  year  accrual  results.   
First,  the  estimate  on  the  level  of  ISW  turns  from  negative  to  positive  as  more  controls  are  added, 
although  it  ends  up  statistically  insignificant  in  the  richest  specification  (specification  4).   
Second,  the  estimated  effect  of  the  incentive  variable  falls  dramatically  as  the  earnings  controls 
are  added.    That  said,  the  estimated  effects  of  the  IS  system  are  smaller  here.    For  example,  in 
specification  4  a  $1000  increase  in  peak  accrual  would  decrease  the  retirement  rate  by  0.38 
percentage  points.    Reference  to  table  2  reveals  that  the  main  difference  between  the  one  year 
and  peak  value  accruals  is  between  ages  55  and  59,  the  peak  value  predicting  a  greater  slope  in 
the  run  up  in  retirement  rates  leading  to  age  60.    Reference  to  the  retirement  hazard  (figure  2) 
provides  little  support  for  this  prediction,  however,  at  least  at  the  mean. 
Finally  in  the  last  block  are  the  results  for  the  option  value  accrual.    Note  that  because  the 
accrual  is  measured  in  units  of  utility,  calibrating  the  marginal  effects  in  dollar  values  no  longer 
makes  any  sense.  The  results  for  this  measure  stand  in  some  contrast  to  the  previous  results.   
                                                                                                                    
36  Chan  and  Stevens  (2001)  find  a  substantial  drop  in  the  magnitude  of  their  incentive  coefficients  when  they  include 
individual  fixed  effects.    If  the  variation  picked  up  by  their  fixed  effects  is  driven  by  differences  in  earnings  histories   28
First,  the  estimated  parameter  on  ISW  bounces  between  negative  and  positive  across 
specifications  in  no  systematic  pattern.    Second,  the  estimated  effect  of  the  incentive  variable  is 
fairly  insensitive  to  specification.   
Results  for  the  female  sample  are  reported  in  table  4.    The  pattern  of  the  results  for  the 
one  year  accrual  is  very  similar  to  that  in  the  male  sample.    The  estimated  effects  of  the  IS 
system  in  specification  4  are  also  very  similar  to  the  male  results,  although  note  that  the 
parameter  on  ISW  is  not  statistically  significant.    For  example  a  $1000  increase  in  one  year 
accrual  lowers  the  retirement  rate  by  0.7  percentage  points  in  comparison  to  0.89  percentage 
points  in  the  male  sample. 
The  peak  value  results  are  also  similar  to  the  male  counterparts,  except  that  here  both  the 
level  of  ISW  and  the  incentive  variable  are  statistically  insignificant  in  specification  4.    We 
observe  the  same  large  reduction  in  the  magnitude  of  the  effect  of  the  incentive  variable, 
however,  once  the  controls  for  APE  and  projected  earnings  are  added.    Finally,  in  contrast  to  the 
results  for  males,  the  option  value  results  also  display  this  pattern  and  the  IS  variables  are  both 
statistically  insignificant  in  specification  4. 
In  sum,  for  males  both  the  one  year  and  peak  value  accrual  estimates  vary  with  changes 
in  specification  in  expected  ways,  and  indicate  that  the  IS  system  has  important  impacts  on 
retirement  behaviour.    The  option  value  estimates  are  harder  to  interpret,  and  change  in 
unexpected  ways  with  specification.    For  females,  it  is  only  the  one  year  accrual  results  that 
indicate  an  important  role  for  the  IS  system.    The  estimates  for  peak  value  and  option  value 
accrual  are  both  statistically  insignificant  in  specification  4.    In  the  subsequent  analysis  we  focus 
on  the  one  year  and  peak  value  results  for  males  and  the  one  year  results  for  females,  although 
results  for  the  full  set  of  measures  are  reported. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
across  individuals,  then  our  results  are  consistent  with  theirs.   29
Sensitivity  Analysis 
Given  our  argument  that  identification  in  retirement  models  can  be  problematic,  it  is 
important  to  provide  some  additional  checks  on  the  inference  in  tables  3  and  4.    In  tables  5  and  6 
we  assess  the  sensitivity  of  our  inference  on  a  number  of  margins.    One  important  issue  is  the 
definition  of  retirement.    Our  working  definition  clearly  misses  some  of  the  various  paths 
individuals  take  to  this  state.    For  example,  individuals  may  effectively  retire  but  still  generate 
some  earnings  through  occasional  employment.    These  earnings  would  lead  us  to  label  the 
individual  as  still  working. 
To  explore  the  consequences  of  our  choice  we  adopt  two  alternatives  definitions  or 
retirement,  which  capture  dimensions  of  this  heterogeneity.      In  the  first  we  allow  for  the 
possibility  that  individuals  may  proceed  to  retirement  through  a  period  of  unemployment,  funded 
by  Employment  Insurance  benefits.    This  is  possible  because  Employment  Insurance  benefits 
generate  a  T4U  form  that  is  recorded  in  our  data.  We  model  this  possibility  by  pooling 
unemployment  benefits  with  earnings  for  the  determination  of  the  retirement  year.    Retirement 
under  this  definition  is  the  year  preceding  the  first  year  of  zero  combined  unemployment  benefits 
and  earnings.    This  definition  is  more  flexible  than  our  standard  retirement  definition  as  it  allows 
for  retirement  through  other  programs. 
In  the  second  alternative  definition,  we  designate  large  reductions  of  earnings  as 
retirement,  without  demanding  that  the  reduction  be  to  zero.    To  make  this  operational,  we  use 
the  retirement  test  that  applies  to  all  individuals  claiming  CPP  or  QPP  benefits  at  ages  60  through 
64.  The  test  requires  that  in  the  year  benefits  are  claimed,  earnings  be  no  more  than  the 
maximum  retirement  pension:  roughly  25  percent  of  a  three  year  moving  average  of  the  YMPE 
(roughly  average  labour  market  earnings).  We  define  retirement  as  the  year  preceding  the  first   30
year  that  earnings  falls  below  the  threshold.  Note  that  by  this  definition  a  transition  from  full 
time  employment  to  part  time  work  may  now  be  labelled  a  retirement. 
The  results  are  presented  in  the  second  and  third  rows  of  the  panels  of  table  5  for  males 
and  table  6  for  females.    As  a  point  of  comparison,  in  the  first  row  of  each  table  we  simply 
replicate  the  estimates  from  specification  4  in  tables  3  and  4.    For  males,  the  UI  definition  leads 
to  similar  or  larger  estimates  of  the  accrual  effects,  but  now  the  ISW  estimates  are  negative, 
although  insignificant  for  one  year  and  peak  value  accrual.    More  importantly  the  marginal 
effects  for  a  $1000  increase  in  accrual  are  very  similar  to  the  base  results  for  both  the  one-year 
and  peak  value  measures.    The  estimates  for  the  earnings  definition  tell  a  very  similar  story.   
Here  the  marginal  effects  for  both  the  accrual  and  ISW  estimates  are  virtually  identical  to  the 
base  results.    The  strong  conclusion  here  is  that  changing  the  definition  of  retirement  has  very 
little  effect  on  the  one-year  and  peak  value  results  for  males. 
Greater  variation  in  inference  is  observed  in  the  results  for  females.    The  marginal  effect 
of  one-year  accrual  is  just  over  half  its  value  in  the  base  results  when  we  use  either  the  UI  or 
earnings  definition  of  retirement.    The  estimated  effect  of  the  level  of  ISW  also  varies  across 
these  definitions.    The  results  for  peak  value  are  more  robust  in  the  sense  that  the  accrual  effects 
are  small  and  statistically  insignificant  regardless  of  the  definition  of  retirement  that  we  use.    The 
estimates  for  the  level  of  ISW  vary  across  definitions  as  they  did  in  the  one-year  results.   
Therefore,  for  females  we  do  observe  some  sensitivity  of  the  inference  to  the  definition  of 
retirement.    This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  there  are  histories  of  movements  in  and  out  of  part 
time  work  for  some  females  in  these  cohorts,  or  that  due  to  the  lower  earnings  of  females,  dips 
below  the  earnings  threshold  do  not  represent  such  significant  falls  in  earnings.   31
In  the  next  rows  of  each  table  we  determine  whether  the  inference  varies  in  sensible  ways 
as  we  attempt  to  isolate  those  individuals  who  should  be  relatively  more  responsive  to  IS 
program  parameters.  The  IS  system  will  be  only  one  element  of  retirement  income  for  some 
individuals.    For  example,  RPP  income  and/or  RRSP  income  may  also  play  an  important  role.  In 
these  cases  we  might  expect  that  the  parameters  of  the  relevant  RPP  and/or  RRSP  rules  would 
also  affect  retirement  behaviour,  and  so  IS  program  parameters  would  be  less  important.    To 
make  this  idea  operational  we  split  the  sample  by  the  imputed  probability  of  RPP  coverage.   
Those  with  a  probability  of  less  than  0.5  are  denoted  as  “RPP  low”,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
sample  is  denoted  “RPP  high”.    Note  we  are  implicitly  assuming  that  the  assignment  of 
individuals  to  these  two  groups  is  exogenous  to  any  preferences  for  retirement  that  also  affect 
any  behavioural  response  to  the  IS  system.   
The  results  are  reported  in  rows  4  and  5  of  tables  5  and  6.    As  expected  we  observe  larger 
behavioural  effects  for  both  males  and  females  in  the  RPP  low  group.  These  are  the  individuals 
who  are  predicted  to  be  more  dependent  on  IS  income  and  so  their  labour  supply  decisions  are 
more  sensitive  to  program  rules.    The  proportionate  differences  in  the  accrual  effects  are  largest 
for  the  one-year  measure,  while  the  proportionate  changes  in  the  effect  of  ISW  tend  to  be  very 
similar  for  the  one-year  and  peak  value  accrual  specifications. 
In  the  next  rows  we  take  a  different  approach.  Here  we  divide  the  sample  into  quartiles 
based  on  average  earnings  at  ages  50  through  54  (that  is,  prior  to  the  sample  observations).    For 
both  males  (one  year  and  peak  value)  and  females  (one  year),  we  see  larger  behavioural  effects 
among  low  income  individuals,  although  the  relationship  is  not  monotonic.    Again  the 
assumption  is  that  these  individuals  will  be  more  dependent  on  IS  income  in  their  retirement 
years  and  consequently  their  retirement  decisions  are  more  dependent  on  IS  program  parameters.       32
This  systematic  variation  in  the  estimates  across  individuals  by  their  predicted  dependency  on 
the  IS  system  provides  us  greater  confidence  that  we  are  capturing  the  behavioural  effects  of  IS 
program  parameters. 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
This  paper  provides  estimates  of  the  retirement  incentives  of  the  Canadian  IS  system 
using  a  unique  data  source.    Our  results  suggest  that  this  system  has  substantive  effects  on  the 
retirement  decisions  of  males  and  females  in  Canada.    The  estimated  effects  are  larger  and  more 
robust  for  males.    Also,  we  obtain  the  largest  effects  when  we  use  relatively  myopic  measures  of 
the  incentives.   
We  also  contribute  more  generally  to  the  retirement  literature  by  evaluating  the   
identification  of  the  incentive  effects  we  estimate.    Controlling  for  lifetime  earnings  in  a  flexible 
way  leads  to  substantially  smaller  estimates  of  these  behavioural  effects.    These  results  add  to  the 
evidence  in  Coile  and  Gruber  (2000)  and  Chan  and  Stevens  (2001)  that  identification  in 
retirement  models  can  be  problematic. 
Finally,  we  examine  the  sensitivity  of  our  inference  to  differences  in  sample  and  the 
definition  of  retirement.    This  exercise  provides  additional  confirmatory  evidence  of  the  effects 
of  pensions  on  retirement,  and  show  that  our  results  are  not  sensitive  to  our  chosen  definition  of 
retirement. 
These  results  potentially  have  important  implications  for  IS  policy.    Evaluation  of 
proposed  pension  reforms  must  account  for  the  dynamic  effect  of  the  reformed  system  on 
retirement  decisions.    Reforms  may  change  not  only  the  distribution  of  retirement  income  and 
fiscal  balances,  but  also  the  timing  of  retirement  decisions.       33
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Appendix   
 
Census  Data 
 
The  data  are  from  the  1986  and  1991  public  use  microdata  files.    In  each  year,  males  or 
females  who  are  54  and  older  are  selected.    Non-labour  income  is  defined  as  the  sum  of   
“Investment  Income  of  census  family  or  non-family  person”  plus  “Retirement  pensions  and  other 
money  income  of  census  family  or  non-family  person”  (recorded  separately  as  “Retirement 
Pensions,  Superannuations  and  Annuities  of  census  family  or  non-family  person”  and  “Other 
Money  Income  of  census  family  or  non-family  person”  in  the  1991  sample).    Separating 
individuals  who  work  (weeks  and  earnings  greater  than  0)  and  don’t  work  (weeks  and  hours 
equal  to  0),  the  probability  non-labour  income  is  positive  and  its  conditional  mean  are  calculated 
for  the  following  cells: 
Males  who  are  Employed:  region  (East;  Ontario;  West)  by  industry  (Manufacturing; 
Construction;  Transportation  and  Communications;  Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade;  FIRE  and 
Business  Services;  Government,  Health  and  Education  Services;  Accommodation,  Food, 
Beverage  and  Other  Services)  by  age(54-55,  56-57,  …,60-61,  62-64  65+),       
Males  Who  are  Not  Employed:  region  (East;  Ontario;  West)  by  marital  status  (married, 
spouse/common-law  partner’s  age  <  age-1;  married,  spouse/common-law  partners  age  =  age1+/- 
1;  married,  spouse/common-law  partner’s  age  >  age+1;  not  married)  by  age  (54-60,  61-63,  64-
66,...73-75,  76+),   
Females  who  are  Employed:  region  (East;  Ontario;  West)  by  industry  (Manufacturing, 
Construction,  Transportation  and  Communications;  Wholesale  and  Retail  Trade;  Finance 
Insurance  and  Real  Estate  (FIRE)  and  Business  Services;  Government,  Health  and  Education   36
Services;  Accommodation,  Food,  Beverage  and  Other  Services)  by  age  (54-55,  56-57,  …,  60-61, 
62-64  65+),       
Females  Who  are  Not  Employed:  region  (East;  Ontario;  West)  by  marital  status  (married, 
spouse/common-law  partner’s  age  <  age-1;  married,  spouse/common-law  partners  age  =  age1+/- 
1;  married,  spouse/common-law  partner’s  age  >  age+1;  not  married)  by  age  (54-60,  61-63,  64-
66,  …,  73-75,  76-80,  81+). 
 
LMAS  and  SLID  Data 
These  data  are  cross  section  samples  from  the  1986-1990  LMAS  and  the  1993-1996 
SLID.    In  each  year,  samples  of  males  or  females,  aged  23-69,  who  are  paid  workers  in  jobs  in 
the  month  of  September  of  the  indicated  year  are  constructed.    The  RPP  coverage  probabilities 
are  then  calculated  by  3-digit  industry.    Probabilities  for  1991-1992,  the  two  years  not  covered 
by  the  LMAS  or  SLID,  are  simple  linear  interpolations  of  the  1990  and  1993  data. 
 
List  of  Variables  from  LWF  data 
 
Agediff:  A  variable  recording  the  difference  in  age  between  an  individual  and  his/her 
spouse/common-law  partner  (in  years). 
 
AGE55-AGE64:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  an  individual  is  the  indicated  age  and  0 
otherwise.    Age55  is  the  excluded  variable. 
 
APE:  a  variable  recording  an  in  estimate  of  an  individual’s  current  Average  Pensionable 
Earnings. 
 
Experience:  A  variable  recording  the  number  years  since  1975  that  an  individual  has  had  positive 
T-4  earnings. 
 
Married:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  the  individual  is  married  and  0  otherwise. 
 
RPP:  A  variable  that  ranges  between  0  and  1  recording  the  proportion  of  workers  in  an 
individual’s  3-digit  industry  that  is  a  member  of  an  RPP.   37
 
Tenure:  A  variable  recording  the  number  of  years  since  1978  that  an  individual  has  been  with  the 
current  firm.     
 
Tenure  Censored:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  an  individual  has  been  with  his/her  current 
firm  continuously  since  1978. 
 
Y85-Y95:  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  in  the  indicated  year  and  0  otherwise.    Y90  is  the 
excluded  variable. 
 
S04-S500p:  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  for  the  indicated  size  of  the  workforce  at  the  place  of 
work  and  0  otherwise.    Categories  are  0-4,5-19,20-49,50-99,100-199,200-499,500+.   
S5099  is  the  excluded  variable. 
 
IND1-IND10:    A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  for  the  indicated  industry  of  employment  and  0 
otherwise.  IND1  is  the  excluded  variable.  The  ten  are: 
    IND1  –  manufacturing  (SIC  100  to  399) 
IND2  –  construction  (SIC  400  to  449) 
IND3  –  storage  and  transportation  (SIC  450  to  499) 
IND4  –  wholesale  trade  (SIC  500  to  599) 
IND5  –  retail  trade  (SIC  600  to  699) 
IND6  –  finance,  insurance,  real  estate  (SIC  700  to  769) 
IND7  –  business  services  (SIC  770  to  809) 
IND8  –  government  services  (SIC  810  to  849) 
IND9  –  education,  health  and  social  services  (SIC  850  to  909) 
IND10  –  accommodation,  food,  and  other  services  (SIC  910  to  999) 
 
NF:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Newfoundland  and  0  otherwise. 
 
PEI:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  PEI  and  0  otherwise. 
 
NS:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Nova  Scotia  and  0  otherwise. 
 
NB:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  New  Brunswick  and  0  otherwise. 
 
QU:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Quebec  and  0  otherwise. 
 
ON:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Ontario  and  0  otherwise   
(excluded  variable). 
 
MB:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Manitoba  and  0  otherwise. 
 
SA:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Saskatchewan  and  0  otherwise. 
 
AB:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Alberta  and  0  otherwise. 
   38
BC:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  British  Columbia  and  0   
otherwise. 
 
TERR:  A  dummy  variable  that  equals  1  if  resident  of  Yukon  or  Northwest  Territories   
and  0  otherwise.   39
 
Table  1:  Summary  Statistics 
  Males  Females 
  Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Retired  0.122  0.328  0.130  0.336 
Probability  of  RPP  0.585  0.256  0.433  0.263 
Married  0.564  0.466  0.422  0.494 
Tenure  8.683  4.521  8.607  4.430 
Tenure  Censored  0.438  0.496  0.374  0.484 
Experience  13.865  3.371  13.109  3.737 
Spouse/common-law  partner’s 
Experience 
5.295  6.875  5.561  7.273 
Age    58.968  2.676  58.732  2.640 
Age  Difference  1.958  3.709  -0.738  2.735 
Projected  Earnings  28634  38007  17068  12172 
Projected  Spousal  Earnings  4935  1151  6433  19389 
APE  29767  7585  20616  10656 
Spouse/common-law  partner’s 
APE 
8298  12092  12110  15824 
Observations  550,839    347,775   
Individuals  110,977    71,066   
 
Notes:  The  reported  statistics  are  means  (averages)  calculated  over  all  observations  in  the  male  and  female  data  sets, 
respectively  (rather  than  over  all  individuals).    All  dollar  values  are  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.    APE  is  Average 
Pensionable  earnings.  Definitions  of  all  variables  are  provided  in  Appendix.       40
 
Table  2:  The  Distribution  of  Different  Measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  Accrual 
 
      One-Year  Accrual  Peak  Value  Accrual  Option  Value  Accrual 
Age  N  Median 
ISW 
Median  1

























Male  Sample 
55  60286  157853  1636  586  2504  707  4824  1608  13433  4807  22972  9203  36292  15214 
56  63460  165216  1418  6  2622  954  3720  255  11940  4787  21426  9714  33320  14399 
57  65700  171713  971  0  2685  1066  2190  0  10133  4391  18998  8645  29810  13679 
58  66687  177573  632  0  2745  1128  1354  0  8087  3797  16512  6954  26440  12733 
59  66761  182815  420  0  2826  1179  925  0  6087  3119  14063  5390  23148  11750 
60  60578  188676  49  -1929  2443  1622  77  -1929  4212  2985  12216  4203  20365  10169 
61  52427  193976  -388  -2237  1840  1571  -386  -2237  2456  2525  10449  3223  17573  9890 
62  44954  195554  -1024  -3041  1110  1598  -1024  -3041  1484  2229  8757  2197  14907  9350 
63  38168  197002  -1651  -3792  580  1754  -1651  -3792  756  2095  7144  1256  12412  8789 
64  31818  188842  -2196  -4440  149  1931  -2196  -4440  205  1975  5589  564  10077  7871 
Female  Sample 
55  43104  155089  915  152  2050  699  3905  1055  10341  3758  14659  4095  27767  9819 
56  43870  147083  865  141  2079  734  3451  672  9466  3598  13850  4662  24947  8777 
57  44122  145894  825  63  2124  783  2699  327  8148  3281  12261  4309  22115  7748 
58  43482  148384  757  0  2145  831  1935  81  6642  2857  10719  3632  19456  6810 
59  42452  152285  701  0  2197  877  1170  0  5127  2488  9175  2852  16967  6094 
60  36937  156092  164  -1487  2099  1390  293  -1484  4016  2568  7936  2196  14936  5556 
61  30662  160337  -63  -1722  1651  1335  -41  -1722  2824  2214  6848  1776  13016  5253 
62  25357  165506  -518  -2248  1029  1340  -515  -2246  1769  1908  5730  1274  11070  4822 
63  20839  169825  -1040  -2846  669  1441  -1038  -2846  1070  1768  4661  779  9211  4149 
64  16950  173793  -1406  -3404  399  1580  -1405  -3404  538  1666  3585  363  7665  3878 
 
Notes:  N=number  of  observations,  ISW=Income  Security  Wealth,  Std.  Dev.=standard  deviation.    All  dollar  values  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.      Definitions  of  the 
different  measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  accrual  are  provided  in  the  text.   41
Table  3:  Estimates  of  the  Retirement  Probits  with  Various  Measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  Accrual  Male  Sample 
 
  One-Year  Accrual  Peak  Value  Accrual  Option  Value  Accrual 




















































$1,000  Increase  -2.40%  -2.08%  -2.16%  -0.89%  -1.20%  -1.08%  -1.09%  -0.38%         
                         
Demographic  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Linear  Age  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Age  Dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Industry  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Firm  Size  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Province  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Year  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Earnings  Controls  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES 
 
Notes:  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.    All  dollar  values  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.      Definitions  of  the  different  measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  accrual  are 
provided  in  the  text.  The  different  control  variables  are  described  in  the  appendix. 
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Table  4:  Estimates  of  the  Retirement  Probits  with  Various  Measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  Accrual  Female  Sample 
 
  One-Year  Accrual  Peak  Value  Accrual  Option  Value  Accrual 




















































$1,000  Increase  -3.20%  -3.26%  -3.39%  -0.70%  -1.51%  -1.58%  -1.56%  -0.03%         
                         
Demographic  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Linear  Age  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO 
Age  Dummies  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Industry  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Firm  Size  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Province  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Year  Controls  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES  NO  YES  YES  YES 
Earnings  Controls  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES  NO  NO  NO  YES 
 
Notes:  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.    All  dollar  values  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.      Definitions  of  the  different  measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  accrual  are 
provided  in  the  text.  The  different  control  variables  are  described  in  the  appendix.   43
 
Table  5:  Sensitivity  Analysis  -  Males 
 
  One-Year  Accrual  Peak  Value  Accrual  Option  Value  Accrual 
  ISW  Accrual  ISW  Accrual  ISW  Accrual 












  0.15% 
 
-0.89%  0.07%  -0.38%     
Estimates  by  Alternative  Definitions  of  Retirement 












  -0.03%  -1.06%  -0.07%  -0.32%     












  0.15%  -0.95%  0.06%  -0.34%     
Estimates  by  Predicted  Probability  of  RPP  Participation 












  0.23%  -1.06%  0.11%  -0.41%     












  0.13%  -0.65%  0.05%  -0.32%     
Estimates  by  Age  50-54  Income  Quartile 
1












  0.59%  -0.81%  0.56%  -0.22%     
2












  0.35%  -0.16%  0.28%  -0.20%     
3












  0.40%  0.43%  0.42%  0.12%     
4












  -0.02%  -0.05%  -0.04%  -0.09%     
 
Notes:  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Marginal  effects  are  reported  below  the  standard  errors  were  applicable.   
They  represent  the  percentage  point  increase  implied  by  the  corresponding  coefficient  for  an  increment  of  $1,000  for 
the  accrual  measures  and  $10,000  for  the  ISW  measures.  All  dollar  values  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.      Definitions  of 
the  different  measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  accrual  are  provided  in  the  text.  All  estimates  are  for  specification 
4  (see  tables  3  and  4).   
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Table  6:  Sensitivity  Analysis  -  Females 
 
  One-Year  Accrual  Peak  Value  Accrual  Option  Value  Accrual 
  ISW  Accrual  ISW  Accrual  ISW  Accrual 
Females 












  0.12% 
 
-0.70%  0.13%  -0.03%     
Estimates  by  Alternative  Definitions  of  Retirement 












  -0.08%  -0.34%  -0.06%  0.04%     












  0.30%  -0.42%  0.28%  -0.03%     
Estimates  by  Predicted  Probability  of  RPP  Participation 












  0.19%  -0.41%  0.19%  -0.04%     












  -0.12%  -0.30%  -0.11%  0.00%     
Estimates  by  Age  50-54  Income  Quartile 
1












  0.24%  -1.09%  0.24%  -0.15%     
2












  0.30%  -0.45%  0.27%  -0.14%     
3












  0.09%  -0.56%  0.00%  -0.41%     
4












  -0.06%  -0.17%  -0.13%  -0.26%     
 
Notes:  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Marginal  effects  are  reported  below  the  standard  errors  were  applicable.   
They  represent  the  percentage  point  increase  implied  by  the  corresponding  coefficient  for  an  increment  of  $1,000  for 
the  accrual  measures  and  $10,000  for  the  ISW  measures.  All  dollar  values  in  1998  Canadian  dollars.      Definitions  of 
the  different  measures  of  Income  Security  Wealth  accrual  are  provided  in  the  text.  All  estimates  are  for  specification 
4  (see  tables  3  and  4).   
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Notes:  CPP  benefit  is  maximum  pension  for  that  year.    GIS  benefits  are  for  single  claimant.    Source  is  http://www.hrdc-
drhc.gc.ca/isp/studies/trends/stats_e.shtml   46
Figure  2:  The  Conditional  Probability  (Hazard)  of  Retirement  at  Different  Ages  Calculated 















































Notes:    The  conditional  probability  of  retirement  (hazard)  is  the  probability  of  retirement  at  a  given  age,  conditional  on  working  at  an 
age  one-year  younger.   
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Notes:    The  conditional  probability  of  retirement  (hazard)  is  the  probability  of  retirement  at  a  given  age,  conditional  on  working  at  an 
age  one-year  younger.   
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